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Abstract	Institutions	and	organizations	are	defined	by	competing	sociomaterial	logics.	Divergence	between	the	‘visible’	and	the	‘hidden’	side	of	organization	invites	a	critical	work	of	‘unveiling’.	But	such	critique	does	not	enable	understanding	of	how	coherency	is	accomplished	between	different	modes	of	reason.	This	is	performed	in	emergent	third	spaces,	where	parasitic	relations	are	enacted.	During	moments	of	‘crisis’	or	‘breach’,	contradictions	are	both	acknowledged	and	given	concrescence.	Management	comes	into	being	in	the	anticipation	of	its	breaking.	Four	accounts	of	this	process	are	offered	–	a	discussion	of	a	remark	from	Michel	Serres’s	The	Parasite,	a	description	of	China	Miélville’s	novel	The	
City	and	The	City,	stories	from	fieldwork	in	medium-secure	forensic	psychiatric	units,	and	set	of	conceptual	propositions.	Together	they	perform	a	descriptive	practice	called	‘dark	organization	theory’	which	analyses	the	functional	aspects	of	divergence	and	breaking	in	management	and	organizational	practices.		
Preface	It	is	an	established	truism	to	point	to	the	competing	‘sociomaterial	logics’,	or	specific	local	modes	of	constituting	meaning	through	shaping	and	ordering	diverse	discourses	and	materials,	that	define	organizations	and	institutions.	There	are	numerous	agendas	and	programmes	of	action	that	rub	up	against	each	other	in	complex	and	often	contradictory	ways.	This	much	we	know	from	Organization	Studies	(Cooper,	2016;	Knox	et	al,	2015),	Science	&	Technology	Studies	(Mol,	2008;	Mol	&	Law,	2002)	and	Institutional	Theory	(Friedland	&	Alford,	1991;	Thornton	et	al,	2012).	Naming	these	tensions	can	proceed	in	many	different	ways:	formal	and	informal	organization;	espoused	logic	and	theories-in-use;	low-level	discourse	and	higher-level	belief;	systems	and	networks;	positions	and	relations	and	so	on.	This	dependency	can	also	been	framed	in	terms	of	‘light’	and	‘darkness’	(see	Burrell,	1997).	Linstead	et	al,	(2014)	argue	that	negative	or	problematic	behaviour	on	the	part	of	organizational	members	and,	indeed,	the	organization	as	whole,	should	not	be	seen	as	driven	by	external	forces	but	rather	as	a	constitutive	‘inside’.	The	neo-psychoanalytic	‘dark	side’	or	unacknowledged,	unconscious	aspect	of	organization	manifests	itself	in	terms	of	misbehavior,	destruction,	violence	and	oppression.	This	invites	a	critical	labour	of	demonstrating	how	the	dark	side	is	enacted	as	a	hidden	hand	within	the	overt	work	of	organization	(see	Hanlon,	2015).		The	divergence	and	contrast	between	competing	logics	should	not,	however,	lead	us	towards	a	notion	of	the	visible	and	the	hidden1.	Organizations	‘function’	or	‘work’	in	spite	of,	of	perhaps	because	of,	their	inherently	contradictory	composition.	There	is	no	mystery	to	be	unveiled	here.	We	do	not	challenge	management	by	pointing	to	a	dark	side	that	it	scarcely	takes	the	trouble	to	hide	in	the	first	place.	But	considering	the	coherence,	or	co-existence,	of	different	logics	raises	the	problem	of	how	they	intersect.	At	what	point	does	one	order	of	
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reason	transform	into	another?	Where	is	the	moment	of	switching	or	reversibility?	Could	this	point,	this	space,	be	treated	as	a	‘third’	that	emerges	between	any	two	(or	more)	given	orders?	What	status	could	it	be	accorded?	And	in	what	sense	would	it	be	implicated	in	the	management	of	incommensurability?	These	kinds	of	questions	cannot	really	be	approached	‘head	on’,	since	to	do	so	risks	prematurely	lapsing	into	one	order	of	reason	to	the	exclusion	of	others.	If	the	‘third	space’	is	emergent,	if	it	denotes	a	provisional	and	elusive	moment	between	the	two	(or	more)	visible	forms	of	order,	then	we	need	to	stage	a	performance	where	that	emergence	takes	place.	This	essay	consists	of	four	individual	pieces	that	perform	the	opening	of	thirdness	through	different	means:	philosophical,	literary,	empirical	and	conceptual2.	Each	individual	piece	gnaws	at	the	same	problem	–	the	emergent	gap	or	‘breach’	that	erupts	between	competing	logics.	Taken	together	they	suggest	a	way	of	approaching	organizational	discontinuities	in	a	sideways	fashion,	glancing	out	of	the	corner	of	our	eyes.	
I	The	point	of	departure	is	with	a	remark	that	Michel	Serres	makes	towards	the	start	of	The	Parasite.	The	book	opens	by	narrating	La	Fontaine’s	version	of	the	parable	of	the	City	Rat	and	the	Country	Rat.	The	story	goes	that	the	country	cousin	visits	his	relative	in	the	city.	At	night,	they	creep	out	onto	a	kitchen	table	filled	with	the	spoils	of	a	feast.	Both	begin	to	take	their	fill	until	they	are	suddenly	disturbed	by	a	noise	at	the	door	and,	taking	fright,	scurry	away	into	the	darkness.	Serres	offers	a	small	diagram	to	illustrate	the	chain	of	actions	involved	in	the	story:	<insert	Figure	1	here>	(Fig.	1	After	Serres,	1982:	4)	The	diagram	indicates	a	succession	or	chain	of	thefts	or	parasitisms.	The	food	on	the	table	comes	from	somewhere,	it	is	the	booty	of	an	initial	theft	left	laying	on	the	table.	The	city	rat	‘intercepts’	this	in	a	second	act	of	parasitism,	which	becomes	itself	the	basis	for	a	further	act	of	theft	by	the	cousin.	And	finally	there	is	another	interruption.	One	more	parasite	is	waiting	at	the	door	to	take	their	place	at	the	purloined	feast.	Serres	then	goes	on	to	remark:	Look	again	at	the	diagram	based	on	the	story	of	the	rats,	paying	attention	to	the	succession	of	parasites	in	a	stepladder	formation,	and	ask	yourself	if	something	is	added	to	the	system,	like	a	cancer	of	interceptions,	flights,	losses,	holes,	trapdoors	–	if	it	is	a	pathological	growth	in	some	spot	or	if	it	is	quite	simply	the	system	itself.	The	rats	climb	onto	the	rug	when	the	guests	are	not	looking,	when	the	lights	are	out,	when	the	party’s	over.	Its	nighttime,	black.	What	happens	would	the	obscure	opposite	of	conscious	and	clear	organization,	happening	behind	everyone’s	back,	the	dark	side	of	
the	system.	But	what	do	we	call	these	nocturnal	processes?	Are	they	destructive	or	constructive?	What	happens	at	night	on	the	rug	covered	with	crumbs?	Is	it	a	still	active	trace	of	(an)	origin?	Or	it	is	only	a	remainder	of	failed	suppressions?	We	can,	undoubtedly,	decide	the	
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matter:	the	battle	against	rats	is	already	lost;	there	is	no	house,	ship,	or	palace	that	does	not	have	its	share.	There	is	no	system	without	parasites.	This	constant	is	a	law.	But	how	so?	(Serres,	1982:	12,	emphasis	added)		The	nighttime	activities	of	the	rats,	the	parasites,	constitute,	for	Serres,	a	‘dark	side	of	the	system’.	How	to	understand	this	phrase?	We	can	start	by	rejecting	a	series	of	alternatives.	Serres	clearly	does	not	locate	the	action	of	the	rats	as	emanating	from	a	source	that	is	external	to	the	system.	This	is	no	exogenous	shock.	The	rats	are	not	outsiders	–	they	are	internal	to	the	very	functioning	of	the	system.	Hence	‘there	is	no	system	without	parasites’.	Moreover,	the	‘dark	side	of	the	system’	is	not	some	hidden	aspect,	a	topographical	‘underworld’	or	‘unconscious’	that	is	suppressed	from	its	normative	functioning.	Recently	this	notion	of	uncovering	‘the	dark	side	of	organization’	has	taken	hold	in	Management	and	Organization	Studies	(Raufflet	&	Mills,	2009;	Tourish,	2013).	Work	in	the	area	aims	to	bring	to	light	‘unseen’	or	‘dirty’	work	(e.g.	Ward	&	McMurry,	2015),	or	hidden	and	secret	histories	of	organizations	and	their	practices	(Hanlon,	2015).	But	often	it	seems	the	only	people	who	were	actually	unaware	of	these	‘dark	sides’	were	organization	analysts.	They	were	perfectly	visible	to	those	who	had	to	routinely	engage	with	them.	All	organizations	engage	to	some	degree	in	banal	violence,	humiliation	and	degradation	in	an	entirely	open	fashion	alongside	their	apparent	formal	good	practices.	This	is	not	what	Serres	means	by	a	‘dark	side	of	the	system’.	We	need	to	think	instead	of	the	interdependency	of	the	different	aspect	of	the	system	with	one	another.	The	‘dark	side	of	the	system’	could	be	thought	of	as	that	which	enables,	allows	for,	perhaps	even	calls	for,	the	constitution	of	the	apparent	order	of	‘conscious	and	clear	organization’.	This	is	the	position	that	Bruno	Latour	works	out	in	detail	from	We	Have	Never	Been	Modern	onwards.	Substituting	the	terms	‘purification’	and	‘hybridization’	for	light	and	dark,	Latour	famously	argues	for	two	generalized	modes	of	ordering	being	conducted	in	concert	with	one	another.	The	ongoing	work	of	producing	dualisms	brings	with	it	an	increased	entanglement	of	relations.	There	are	no	systems	that	are	not,	at	the	same	time,	networks.	There	are	no	pure	terms	without	the	thousands	of	mediators	through	which	they	are	accomplished.	The	problem	is	the	denial	of	this	practical	reality	in	formal	epistemology:	The	moderns	have	always	been	using	both	dimensions	in	practice,	they	have	always	been	explicit	about	each	of	them,	but	they	have	never	been	explicit	about	the	relation	between	the	two	sets	of	practices.	Nonmoderns	have	to	stress	the	relations	between	them	if	they	are	to	understand	both	the	moderns’	successes	and	their	recent	failure,	and	still	not	lapse	into	postmodernism.	By	deploying	both	dimensions	at	once,	we	may	be	able	to	accommodate	the	hybrids	and	give	them	a	place,	a	name,	a	home,	a	philosophy,	an	ontology,	and,	I	hope,	a	new	constitution.	(Latour,	1993:	51)	The	gesture	of	‘deploying	both	dimensions’	at	once	is	auto-deconstructive.	Merely	placing	a	sketch	of	the	network	in	the	same	space	of	that	as	the	system	demonstrates	both	the	necessity	and	the	impossibility	of	properly	thinking	their	interdependency.	The	organization	is	hierarchies,	goals,	sub-systems	and	
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functions.	The	organization	is	rhizomes,	interceptions,	quasi-objects	and	translations.	A	diagram	of	these	two	contradictory	descriptions	juxtaposed	together	invites	a	creative	work	of	narrating	the	point	where	one	slides	into	the	other.	Typically	this	takes	the	form	of	positing	one	dimension	as	the	eventual	limit	of	the	other.	Dualism,	on	this	account,	is	what	a	network	looks	like	in	its	most	distended	form,	whilst	translation	becomes	the	mythic	originary	matrix	in	which	opposed	terms	find	their	point	of	co-incidence	and	‘originary’	co-emergence.		<insert	figure	2	here>	Fig	2.	In	the	style	of	Latour,	1993,	p.11	The	general	point	then	seems	to	be	something	like	the	need	to	keep	notions	of	‘conscious	and	clear	organization’	simultaneously	in	play	with	the	‘dark	side	of	the	system’.	Unraveling	the	system	into	a	network	can	then	analytically	perform	the	breaking	up	of	the	idea	of	management.	Summing	the	network	back	up	into	positions	and	functions	does	the	reverse	work	of	showing	how	complex	sets	of	relations	become	simplified	as	apparent	hierarchies	and	dichotomies.	But	at	what	point	is	the	transition	from	one	to	the	other	accomplished?	Travelling	from	one	direction,	we	often	go	from	one	set	of	terms	to	another	and	so	on,	until	the	swarm	of	relations	that	emerges	might	just	as	well	be	called	a	network.	Starting	from	the	reverse	direction,	the	network	starts	to	implacably	stack	up	so	many	loops	and	displacements	that	at	a	certain	moment	it	is,	of	course,	a	system	for	all	formal	purposes.		What	is	interesting	about	both	directions	of	travel	is	that	the	transition	point	comes	not	in	the	middle	of	the	account,	but	right	at	the	end,	as	a	sort	of	penultimate	turning	around	on	the	analysis.	Deleuze	&	Guattari	(1983)	once	used	the	phrase	‘conjunctive	synthesis’	to	describe	these	kinds	of	naming	practices	–	‘Ah,	so	it’s	this	after	all!’.	They	compared	them	to	the	burp	of	the	freshly	fed	infant,	a	sign	that	indicates	both	a	completion	and	transformative	recapitulation	of	the	process.	So	the	system	really	was	a	network,	after	all	was	said	and	done.	How	strange,	that	all	these	relations	and	translations	came	to	act	as	system,	at	the	end	of	the	day.	The	conjunctive	synthesis	is	a	kind	of	heavily	scaffolded	gestalt	switch.	In	this	respect,	consider	an	image	with	which	we	are	all	familiar:	<insert	Figure	3	here>	(Fig	3.	E. Hill, Moja żona i moja teściowa, 1915, Creative Commons)	The	viewer	starts	with	one	picture,	the	thing	they	see	first,	either	the	old	woman	facing	towards	bottom	left,	or	the	young	woman	turned	away	towards	the	frame.	To	nudge	the	viewer	from	one	image	to	the	other,	we	typically	point	out	key	features.	Look	there,	where	the	nose	becomes	a	chin,	the	eye	morphs	into	an	ear,	the	mouth	changes	to	a	necklace.	But	despite	this	gradual	preparatory	work,	the	switch	happens	all	at	once:	‘Ah,	so	it’s….’.	Critical	work	takes	this	same	format.	Extensive	thick	description	prepares	the	ground	for	the	penultimate	‘reveal’	where	the	organization	changes,	all	at	once,	in	its	entirety	(see	Knox	et	al,	2015).	To	use	the	classical	language	of	illusion	popularized	by	Christopher	Nolan’s	film	
	 5	
The	Prestige,	the	analytic	breaking	up	management	involves	a)	the	pledge	that	there	is	a	‘dark	side’	to	the	system;	b)	the	turn	of	thick	description	of	relations	and	c)	the	prestige	of	the	eventual	gestalt	switch	from	system	to	network.		But	let	us	return	for	a	moment	to	the	two	long	quotes	by	Serres	and	Latour.	A	historical	account	of	Actor-Network	Theory	might	see	the	latter	quote	as	the	answer	to	the	former.	If	we	wish	to	cede	the	identification	of	two	interdependent	modes	of	ordering	to	Serres,	then	Latour’s	efforts	to	demonstrate	the	necessity	of	thinking	both	the	analytical	and	the	constitutional	places	where	these	modes	cross	(and	double-cross)	one	another	gives	us	our	contemporary	critical	position.	However,	what	if	the	dark	side	of	the	system	is	just	not	its	inversion	into	a	network	or	the	effect	of	the	gestalt	switch	from	one	mode	to	another?	What	if	there	is	another	kind	of	emergent	space,	a	third	term	between	system	and	network?	It	would	be	difficult	to	perceive	this	kind	of	space,	if	it	has	any	kind	of	existence	at	all,	because	it	lies	in	the	hinge	or	crossing	space	between	the	two	terms.	This	would	be	a	dark	space	not	simply	in	terms	or	a	reversal	of	what	is	usually	perceived,	but	dark	as	a	negation	of	perception	entirely.	The	critique	of	management	typically	proceeds	through	continuous	inversion,	upending	the	organization	this	way	and	that	to	show	how	the	two	modes	of	‘light’	and	‘dark’	depend	upon	one	another.	It	is	this	sense	that	critique	can	appear	to	be	parasitic,	in	the	common	use	of	the	term,	since	it	attaches	itself	externally	to	its	objects	of	study,	and	creates	its	own	value	through	the	demonstration	of	how	to	invert	the	image,	now	light,	now	dark.	However,	in	doing	so	it	leaves	management	pretty	much	untouched,	since	it	does	little	to	disrupt	or	destabilize	the	internal	relation	of	‘light’	and	‘dark’	to	one	another.	What	is	required	is	not	less	parasitism,	but	a	more	effective	form	–	an	
endoparasitic	criticality	that	is	capable	of	entering	into	management	and	organization	practices,	rather	than	just	attaching	to	them	externally,	and	seeking	out	the	third	spaces	where	reversals	in	modes	of	ordering	occur.	It	is	here,	in	interstitial	spaces	that	emerge	in	the	alternation	between	modes	of	ordering	that	a	genuine	disruption	or	breaking	apart	might	not	only	located,	but	also	fostered	and	encouraged.	
II	China	Miéville’s	The	City	&	The	City	begins	as	detective	story.	The	story	opens	in	the	central	European	sounding	city	of	Besźel	with	Tyador	Borlú	of	the	Extreme	Crime	Squad	summoned	to	investigate	a	murder	scene	in	a	run	down	former	industrial	area.	The	narrative	proceeds	as	one	would	expect,	with	the	sifting	of	clues	and	the	assigning	of	responsibilities,	right	until	Borlú	is	preparing	to	depart:	Rackhaus	said	something	that	I	ignored.	As	I	turned,	I	saw	past	the	edges	of	the	estate	to	the	end	of	GunterStrász,	between	the	dirty	brick	buildings.	Trash	moved	in	the	wind.	It	might	be	anywhere.	An	elderly	woman	was	walking	slowly	away	from	me	in	a	shambling	sway.	She	turned	her	head	and	looked	at	me.	I	was	struck	by	her	motion,	and	I	met	her	eyes.	I	wondered	if	she	wanted	to	tell	me	something.	In	my	glance	I	took	in	her	clothes,	her	way	of	walking,	of	holding	herself,	and	looking.	With	a	hard	start,	I	realized	that	she	was	not	on	GunterStrász	at	all,	and	that	I	should	
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not	have	seen	her.	Immediately	and	flustered	I	looked	away,	and	she	did	the	same	with	the	same	speed.	I	raised	my	head,	towards	an	aircraft	on	its	final	descent.	When	after	some	seconds	I	looked	back	up,	unnoticing	the	old	woman	stepping	heavily	away,	I	looked	carefully	instead	of	at	her	in	the	foreign	street	at	the	facades	of	the	nearby	and	local	GunterStrász,	that	depressed	zone.	(2009:	14)	The	woman	who	Borlú	sees	is	not,	in	fact,	in	the	same	city.	She	is	a	resident	of	Ul	Qoma,	an	entirely	distinct	city	which,	through	a	speculative	fictional	device	which	is	never	completely	unpacked	in	the	novel,	is	situated	in	the	same	topographical	space	as	Besźel.	Many	parts	of	these	two	cities,	superimposed	on	one	another,	appear	to	exist	in	something	like	parallel	dimensions.	One	can	be	at	the	same	geographical	point	in	either	city,	and,	for	practical	purposes,	be	unconcerned	with	the	existence	of	the	other.	Both	cities	have	their	own	particular	history,	culture,	architecture	and	political	system.	They	exist	as	something	like	independent	sovereign	states,	with	their	own	separate	sets	of	international	relations	to	the	rest	of	the	world:	If	someone	needed	to	go	to	a	house	physically	next	door	to	their	own	but	in	a	neighbouring	city,	it	was	in	different	road	in	an	unfriendly	power.	That	is	what	foreigners	rarely	understood.	A	Besź	dweller	cannot	walk	a	few	paces	next	door	into	an	alter	house	without	breach.	But	pass	through	Copula	Hall	and	she	or	he	might	leave	Besźel,	and	at	the	end	of	the	hall	come	back	to	exactly	(corporeally)	where	they	had	just	been,	but	in	another	country,	a	tourist,	a	marveling	visitor,	to	a	street	that	shared	the	latitude-longitude	of	their	own	address,	a	street	they	had	never	visited	before,	whose	architecture	they	had	always	unseen,	to	the	Ul	Qoman	house	sitting	next	to	and	a	whole	city	away	from	their	own	building,	unvisible	there	now	they	had	come	through,	all	the	way	across	the	breach,	back	home.	(p.	86)	Despite	their	topographical	superimposition,	there	is	only	one	place	–	a	crossing/border	point	known	as	‘Copula	Hall’	–	where	it	is	permitted	for	residents	of	Besźel	and	Ul	Qoma	to	cross	to	the	other	city.	Proximal	points,	such	as	neighbouring	house,	are,	in	fact,	topologically	or	relationally	distant	to	one	another,	since	they	can	only	be	legally	reached	through	an	enormous	physical	and	political	detour.	But	there	are	also	other	points	of	contact	where	the	two	cities	meet	in	more	ambiguous	ways,	known	as	‘cross-hatched’	areas.	Here	the	boundaries	between	Besźel	and	Ul	Qoma	can	appear	porous.	Roads	are	shared,	buildings	appear	to	shade	into	another.	Passersby	in	each	city	mingle	together,	present	in	the	same	topographical	space,	but	oriented	towards	their	own	sets	of	distinct	topological	socio-material	relations	and	coordinates.		The	central	device	of	the	novel	concerns	the	separation	of	the	two	cities.	Besźel	and	Ul	Qoma	are	not	merely	distinct	political	entities,	they	are	policed	as	divorced	phenomenological	realities.	Residents	of	each	city	must	maintain	the	boundaries	between	the	two	states	by	systematically	ignoring	or	‘unseeing’	the	other:	 When	an	Ul	Qoman	stumbles	into	a	Besź,	each	in	their	own	city;	if	Ul	Qoman’s	dog	runs	up	an	sniffs	a	Besź	passerby;	a	window	broken	in	Ul	
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Qoma	that	leaves	glass	in	the	path	of	the	Besź	pedestrians	–	in	all	the	cases	the	Besź	(or	Ul	Qomans,	in	the	converse	circumstances)	avoid	the	foreign	difficulty	as	best	they	can	without	acknowledging	it.	Touch	if	they	must,	though	not	is	better.	Such	polite	stoic	unsensing	is	the	form	for	dealing	with	protubs	–	that	is	the	Besź	for	those	protuberances	from	the	other	city.	(p.	80)	The	boundaries	between	the	city	are	maintained	by	an	individualized	disciplining	of	the	senses	that	becomes	almost	a	reflex	action.	Citizens	are	inculcated	into	a	regime	of	‘un-seeing’,	deliberately	not	noticing,	along	with	‘un-hearing’,	‘un-smelling’	and	so	on.	This	requires	considerable	cultural	and	practical	skill,	particularly	around	shared	roads,	where	drivers	must	orient	to	one	another	at	the	fringes	of	their	perception,	simultaneously	ignoring	and	taking	care	of	the	position	of	their	‘topol-gangers’	in	the	other	city.	The	extensive	training	of	the	senses	is	assisted	by	an	agreed	upon	maintenance	of	distinct	semiotic	codes	around	speech,	movement,	dress	and	architecture	for	the	two	cities.	Knowledge	of	these	codes	allows	citizens	to	selectively	focus	their	attention	on	their	own	city,	backgrounding	that	of	the	other	that	impinges	in	a	shadowy	way	on	their	fringes	of	their	senses.		Each	city	maintains	its	own	juridical	system.	Whilst	there	are	political	points	of	contact	between	the	two	cities,	in	order	to	resolve	disputes	around	shared	resources,	there	is	a	separate	mechanism	that	ensures	compliance	with	‘unseeing’.	Unauthorized	crossing	over	between	the	two	cities,	through	acknowledging	‘topol-gangers’,	is	known	as	‘breach’.	Breach	is	the	name	for	both	the	act	itself	of	violating	the	phenomenological	and	legal	separation	of	the	two	cities	and	the	mysterious	power	that	enforces	this	separation:	‘Breach’.	‘Breach’.	I	thought	it	was	a	shocked	declaration	by	those	who	had	witnessed	the	crime.	But	unclear	figures	emerged	where	there	had	been	no	purposeful	instants	before,	only	the	milling	of	no	ones,	the	aimless	and	the	confused,	and	those	suddenly	appeared	newcomers	with	faces	so	motionless	I	hardly	recognized	them	as	faces	were	saying	the	word.	It	was	a	statement	of	both	crime	and	identity.	(p.285-6)	The	relationship	between	the	sovereign	powers	of	the	two	cities	and	that	of	this	strange	third	power	that	underwrites	their	separation	is	the	principle	thread	to	the	story.	In	some	histories,	Besźel	and	Ul	Quoma	were	once	a	single	city,	which	at	a	certain	point	divided.	The	identity	and	fate	of	this	autochthonic	origin	of	the	two	cities	–	known	as	Orciny	–	has	passed	into	myths	that	treated	as	either	fairy	stories	for	children	or	dangerous	subversions.	In	some	versions	of	the	myth,	Orciny	did	not	fragment	at	all,	but	continues	to	exist	as	a	hidden	third	space	between	the	cities.	Perhaps	Orciny	is	actually	the	name	through	which	Breach	refers	to	itself.	Two	cities,	then,	functioning	as	distinct	systems,	with	their	own	infrastructures	and	organizational	forms,	sat	grosstopically	in	the	same	space.	Between	the	two,	a	clear	boundary	which	allows	communication	only	through	very	specific	institutional	and	diplomatically	processes.	Maintenance	of	the	boundary	ceded	to	a	third,	shadowy	force	which	seems	to	exist	as	a	third	place	that	is	both	
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everywhere	–	since	the	powers	of	observation	and	intervention	that	Breach	enact	appear	almost	limitless	–	and	nowhere:	THE	BREACH	WAS	NOTHING.	It	is	nothing.	This	is	a	commonplace;	this	is	simple	stuff.	The	Breach	has	no	embassies,	no	army,	no	sites	to	see.	The	Breach	has	no	currency.	If	you	commit	it	it	will	envelop	you.	Breach	is	a	void	full	of	angry	police.	This	trail	that	led	and	led	again	to	Orciny	suggested	systematic	transgression,	secret	para-rules,	a	parasite	city	where	there	should	be	nothing	but	nothing,	nothing	but	Breach.	(p.297)	Breach	is	parasitic	on	Besźel	and	Ul	Quoma.	It	has	no	sovereign	powers	of	its	own	beyond	its	role	in	serving	as	the	conditions	of	the	formation	of	the	two	cities	as	political	entities.	Breach	is	nothing,	is	grounded	in	nothing,	and	has	nothing	to	trade	or	even	communicate	beyond	its	own	parasitic	existence.	This	becomes	clear	late	in	the	novel,	when	it	is	revealed	that	the	‘angry	police’	who	are	recruited	into	Breach	are	effectively	‘press-ganged’	from	the	two	cities.	The	transgressors	become	the	next	generation	of	border	guards.	Or	as	Breach	put	it	simply:	do	what	you	will	in	your	own	cities,	but	if	you	breach	then	you’re	ours.	The	boundary	is	nothing	and	nowhere,	until	it	is	revealed	through	the	act	of	breach.	And	then	it	envelops	you…	What	begins	as	a	detective	story	then	ends	up	a	parable	about	how	the	co-existence	of	two	vastly	different	spaces	is	maintained	by	the	withdrawing	of	the	procedures	for	their	maintenance	into	an	in-sensible	third	space.	The	idea	of	a	secret	power	–	Orciny	–	proves	to	be	a	ruse.	It	is	a	device	to	attract	critique	and	dissent	and	misdirect	it	across	the	boundary	(the	clues	to	find	Orciny	are	always	elsewhere,	in	the	other	city	from	where	one	is	searching).	Breach	itself	is	not	a	secret,	since	it	is	always	acknowledged.	But	its	power	to	both	disrupt	and	maintain,	to	break	and	reconnect,	comes	from	its	displacement.	Breach	alone	provides	the	space	for	a	deconstruction	of	the	grosstopic	arrangement	of	the	two	cities,	whilst	also	providing	the	means	for	this	ongoing	continuation.	As	Tyador	Borlú	discovers,	the	only	space	that	provides	for	a	critique	of	Besźel	and	Ul	Quoma	is,	literally,	the	nowhere	space	that	exists	between	them.	
III	Forensic	psychiatric	care	is	a	practice	for	the	management	of	persons	with	mental	health	issues	who	have	either	been	accused	of	or	convicted	of	criminal	offences	that	exists	outside	of	the	penal	system.	It	is	usually	embedded	within	the	general	hospital	system,	maintained	in	the	UK	through	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS),	rather	than	within	prisons.	There	are	three	levels	of	secure	care	–	high,	medium,	low	–	that	are	implemented	in	different	sites.	The	highest	level	of	care	is	reserved	for	service	users	who	have	typically	been	involved	in	a	significant	crime	(or	‘index	offence’)	for	which	they	are	deemed	either	not	responsible	due	to	their	mental	health	at	the	time,	or	unsuited	to	the	prison	system	by	virtue	of	their	ongoing	mental	health	issues.	Patients	at	these	sites	will	typically	be	in	the	system	for	decades	rather	than	years.	Medium-secure	units	are	normally	attached	to	hospitals,	and	act	as	sites	where	service	users	‘transition’	from	the	prison	or	legal	system	into	psychiatric	care,	or	downwards	from	high-security	care.	Time	spent	in	medium-secure	care	can	vary	from	around	3-15	years,	depending	on	the	rate	of	progress	made	in	stabilizing	the	
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patient’s	mental	health.	Service-users	in	both	high	and	medium	secure	care	are	formally	detained	under	a	Part	3	section	of	the	Mental	Health	Act	(i.e.	‘sectioned’),	and	are	not	at	liberty	to	leave	until	either	a	Mental	Health	Tribune	or	the	Secretary	of	State	(for	convicted	prisoners)	deems	it	appropriate.	Low	secure	care	takes	place	in	hostels	and	sheltered	accommodation	within	the	community,	and	represents	the	penultimate	point	in	the	rehabilitation	process.	The	espoused	logic	of	forensic	mental	health	care	is	to	enable	the	recovery	of	the	patient	to	a	sufficient	level	where	they	can	either	be	returned	back	to	prison	or	released	into	the	community	to	engage	with	outpatient	mental	health	services.	The	guiding	principle	that	governs	decisions	around	transitions	through	secure	care	is	the	assessment	of	the	risk	to	self	and	risk	to	others	on	the	part	of	the	patient.	Note	that	recovery	is	not	equivalent	to	cure	–	once	a	diagnosis	of	a	mental	health	condition	has	been	made,	the	goal	is	to	stabilize	symptoms	and	behaviour	to	a	degree	where	they	can	be	self-managed	(a	common,	albeit	contestable,	comparison	is	with	diabetes).	Secure	care	is	very	expensive	to	provide,	especially	in	cases	where	there	are	complex	needs,	and	there	are	financial	and	political	pressures	on	service	provision,	leading	to	increasing	reliance	within	the	NHS	upon	out-sourced	care	with	Charity	and	commercial	providers.	The	following	observations	are	based	on	empirical	work	in	two	medium-secure	units	located	in	a	large	city	in	the	South	of	England	(Brown	et	al,	2014;	Reavey	et	al,	n.d.).	Medium-secure	forensic	psychiatric	units	look	like	prisons,	and	if	they	were	not	usually	placed	on	hospital	grounds	you	would	easily	mistake	them	as	such.	The	walls	and	entry	points	to	the	unit	are	secure	and	designed	to	prevent	unauthorized	entry	and	exit.	There	are	high	walls,	locked	doors,	airlock	style	entry	systems,	cameras	and	continuous	staffing	presence.	Who	and	what	goes	in	and	out	is	closely	monitored.	This	is	ritualized	in	the	practices	of	control	and	surveillance,	including	routine	searches	of	wards	and	patient’s	bedrooms.	Entering	the	unit	can	take	some	time	and	is	subject	to	the	working	patterns	of	nursing	staff,	many	of	whom	are	managing	multiple	and	sometimes	unpredictable	demands	on	their	time.		Staff	typically	characterize	their	day-to-day	activities	in	terms	of	the	‘calmness’	of	the	ward	on	which	they	are	working	(a	medium-secure	unit	usually	has	around	6-8	individual	wards	which	are	divided	by	factors	such	gender,	length	of	stay	and	diagnosis).	A	‘calm	ward’	is	a	general	atmosphere	defined	by	minimal	agitation	on	the	part	of	the	patients	and	reasonably	unproblematic	relationships	between	patients	and	staff.	Being	able	to	sense	changes	in	the	atmosphere	is	a	key	skill	that	nursing	staff	develop,	which	draws	upon	sensitivity	to	a	range	of	visual	and	auditory	cues	in	the	space	of	the	ward	(Kanyeredzi	et	al,	n.d.).	There	are	routine	events	that	threaten	the	atmosphere,	such	as	the	admission	of	new	patients	transferring	from	prison	and	unsuccessful	Mental	Health	Tribunals,	along	with	daily	activities	such	as	mealtimes	and	arguments	over	the	selection	of	channels	on	the	communal	television.	Probably	the	single	greatest	challenge	is	the	sheer	lack	of	activities	available	to	patients.	Outside	of	semi-regular	group	sessions	aimed	at	developing	basic	life	skills,	there	is	little	by	way	of	either	therapeutic	or	recreation	activities.	Watching	television	communally	or	laying	down	in	a	bedroom	comprises	the	major	part	of	a	patient’s	day.	
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The	maintenance	of	a	calm	atmosphere	on	the	ward,	accomplished	through	the	stabilization	of	patient	behaviour,	is	then	the	primary	practical	goal	sought	by	nursing	staff.	Whilst	work	on	ward	exposes	staff	to	some	dangers,	such	as	being	injured	whilst	intervening	in	patient’s	behaviour,	the	primary	risk	is	to	the	institution.	Losing	control	over	some	aspect	of	the	ward	environment	(e.g.	the	preparation	of	hot	drinks)	or	of	the	ward	itself	is	the	most	significant	threat.	There	is	then	a	disjunction	between	the	espoused	logic	of	the	practice,	which	seeks	patient	recovery	through	minimization	of	risk	to	self	and	others,	and	the	
practical	logic	of	running	a	ward,	which	aims	at	patient	stabilization	as	a	means	of	reducing	risk	to	the	institution.		This	divergence	in	logics	can	be	illustrated	in	a	number	of	ways.	A	ward	is	composed	of	a	number	of	communal	spaces,	such	as	a	central	living	area	and	a	dining	space,	along	with	individual	patient	bedrooms	and	small	meeting	rooms	(where	appointments	with	consultant	psychiatrists	and	tribunals	are	held).	The	nurses’	station	is	usually	located	at	a	central	point,	with	clear	lines	of	sight	around	the	majority	of	the	ward.	Since	nurses	need	access	to	records,	computers	and	some	medical	supplies,	part	of	the	station	will	be	within	a	lockable	room,	with	large	glass	windows.	On	one	occasion	we	were	sat	in	the	locked	room	waiting	for	an	appointment.	A	number	of	nurses	were	present,	updating	the	daily	electronic	records	detailing	the	condition	of	patients	on	the	ward.	This	was	being	done	by	cutting	and	pasting	details	from	the	previous	day,	and,	where	needed,	making	adjustments	to	the	text.	Whilst	this	was	being	done,	a	patient	was	repeatedly	knocking	on	the	door,	requesting	that	staff	give	him	access	to	an	ironing	board.	He	was	initially	ignored	by	the	nurses,	then	discouraged.	The	door	remained	locked.	We	were	told	that	responding	to	minor	patient	requests	whilst	within	the	room	was	counter-productive,	since	it	simply	encouraged	more	such	requests,	disrupting	the	flow	of	activities.	The	orderly	management	of	interactions	on	the	ward	clearly	took	precedent	over	monitoring	individual	needs.	A	recent	major	complicating	factor	has	been	the	imposition	of	a	ban	of	smoking	in	both	the	inside	and	outside	spaces	in	mental	health	units.	Before	the	ban,	it	was	common	to	observe	patients	clustering	around	the	nurses’	station,	waiting	for	a	member	of	staff	to	accompany	them	to	an	outside	space	and	provide	them	with	a	lighter	to	smoke.	In	many	wards,	staff	developed	informal	work	practices	to	routinize	these	requests	through	rotas	or,	even,	we	have	been	told,	through	a	kind	of	‘production	line’	where	queues	of	patients	received	a	cigarette	from	one	member	of	staff,	which	was	lit	by	another,	as	they	passed	through	the	door	to	a	garden	space,	before	processing	back	inside.	Clearly	these	practices	are	at	odds	with	the	health	logic	that	underpins	the	goal	of	recovery.	But	they	are	consonant	with	the	logic	of	maintaining	a	calm	ward.	Significant	numbers	of	service	users	are	smokers,	who	have	large	amounts	of	time	with	very	little	to	do,	and	are	legally	prevented	from	doing	the	one	thing	that	might	alleviate	their	frustration.	The	informal	management	of	smoking	reduces	collective	aggravation	between	staff	and	patients	(Matthews	et	al,	2005).	Another	instance	of	the	tension	between	health	agendas	and	staff	routines	is	around	kitchen	spaces.	For	many	service	users,	food	is	a	major	source	of	complaint.	Meals	are	normally	prepared	outside	the	unit	and	are	served	
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according	to	strict	menus	chosen	well	in	advance	(this	is	done	in	part	to	avoid	arguments	over	choice	and	portion	size	when	they	are	served).	Not	being	able	to	choose	either	what	or	when	to	eat	is	a	continuous	source	of	patient	dissatisfaction.	This	is	often	recognized	on	wards	where	patients	are	close	to	staged	discharge,	and	where	some	facilities	may	be	made	available	for	selected	patients	to	do	some	cooking	for	themselves.	In	one	newly	built	unit,	we	observed	that	the	design	of	wards	included	the	provision	of	a	small	kitchen.	However,	when	we	asked	patients	how	regularly	they	were	able	to	make	use	of	kitchens,	we	were	told	that	they	were	rarely	used	(this	was	also	apparent	from	their	spotless	condition).	Cooking	activities	require	a	ratio	of	two	staff	members	for	every	patient,	ostensively	because	of	the	risks	involved	in	access	to	kitchen	equipment	and	cutlery.	Losing	the	equivalent	of	four	person	hours	of	staff	time	for	every	session	with	two	patients	clearly	detracts	from	the	overall	management	of	the	ward.	So	for	the	majority	of	the	time,	the	kitchens	remain	locked	and	patients	can	only	stare	in	through	the	windows	and	imagine	what	they	might	have	been	able	to	do.		The	vast	majority	of	wards	are	separated	by	patient	gender.	One	of	the	rationales	for	this	separation	is	the	management	of	the	risk	of	(hetero)	sexual	predation	and	exploitation	amongst	‘vulnerable’	adults	(Brown	&	Reavey,	2016).	Personal	and	sexual	relationships,	whatever	their	orientation,	are	broadly	discouraged	and	normally	subject	to	sanction	within	medium-secure	units.	Nevertheless	patients	do	engage	in	clandestine	sexual	activity	with	one	another	and	form	personal	relationships.	Staff	are	aware	of	these	possibilities,	and	the	ways	in	which	particular	ward	designs	may	afford	‘blindspots’,	or	of	the	opportunities	that	leave	to	visit	the	hospital	grounds	may	afford	(e.g.	sexual	liaisons	in	public	toilets).	Whilst	the	institution	itself	cannot	tolerate	patient	sexuality,	because	it	is	indexed	to	risk	to	self-and-others	(Brown	et	al,	2014),	nursing	staff	seem	to	tolerate	moderate	sexual	banter	and	accept	that	patients	progressing	towards	transition	to	the	community	are	likely	to	engage	in	sexual	activity	(particularly	on	community	visits).	What	is	formally	seen	as	threatening	to	recovery	is	treated	as	practically	assisting	stabilization	as	the	patient	moves	through	the	forensic	psychiatric	system.	Medium-secure	units	are	then	composed	of	(at	least)	two	competing	orders	of	reason,	an	espoused	logic	and	a	practical	logic.	For	the	most	part,	these	co-exist	and	orient	towards	one	another	without	having	to	declare	their	incommensurability.	However,	there	are	moments	when	the	two	orders	seem	to	collapse	into	one	another	and	a	third	kind	of	space	briefly	emerges.	For	example,	modern	ward	designs	place	considerable	emphasis	on	sightlines.	Placing	an	open	nurses	station	at	the	very	centre	of	the	ward,	and	then	arranging	communal	spaces	immediately	around	the	station,	with	bedrooms	and	other	rooms	as	‘spokes’	radiating	out	from	the	centre,	means	that	staff	who	sit	at	the	station	can	maintain	surveillance	over	the	greater	part	of	the	ward	space.	However,	as	mentioned	previously,	this	apparent	control	over	the	ward	exposes	staff	to	continuous	requests	from	patients,	and	as	a	consequence,	nursing	staff	often	place	themselves	in	the	locked	office	part	of	the	station.	Moreover,	the	control	provided	by	the	central	location	is	reversible.	As	one	staff	member	observed,	it	requires	only	one	agitated	patient,	armed	with	a	pen,	to	take	a	hostage	at	the	
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nurses	station,	for	control	to	be	ceded	control,	since	the	patient	would	now	be	able	to	take	advantage	of	all	the	sightlines.		The	formal	and	the	informal	logics	that	are	in	play	around	the	nurses	station	(e.g.	the	control	of	sightlines	and	the	maintenance	of	work	routines)	are	suspended	or	breached	by	the	possibility	of	hostage	taking.	Power	shifts	away,	if	only	temporarily,	from	both	the	control	mechanisms	of	the	institution	and	the	informal	management	strategies	of	nursing	staff.	It	becomes	difficult	to	discern	the	difference	between	risk	to	self-and-others	and	risk	to	the	institution,	which	merge	into	a	critical	situation.	Admittedly,	this	kind	of	event	is	comparatively	rare.	It	is	‘nothing’	compared	to	the	routine	dramas	of	life	on	the	ward	and	yet	it	is	‘everything’	in	respect	to	the	coherency	of	the	normal	logics	in	play,	since	it	threatens	their	separation.	Why	focus	on	recovery,	when	there	is	such	an	enormous	risk?	Why	try	to	work	towards	a	‘calm’	atmosphere,	when	it	can	go	so	catastrophically	wrong?	The	breach	of	hostage	taking	is	like	a	shadow	that	reminds	staff	of	just	why	it	is	that	the	formal	and	the	informal	cannot	acknowledge	one	another,	since	to	do	so	would	make	their	particular	versions	of	care	mutually	unworkable.	Anticipation	of	this	breach	is	then	a	major	dynamic	within	the	unit.	Often	unspoken,	it	is	third	order	of	reason	all	to	itself	that	haunts	and	divides	the	other	two.	It	represents	both	the	transgression	of	the	dual	ordering	of	the	ward,	and	the	basis	for	their	ongoing	regulation.	It	is	some	sense	both	the	‘real’	site	of	management	–	the	space	that	must	be	continuously	anticipated	within	everyday	decisions	made	on	the	ward	–	and	the	basis	on	which	espoused	management	is	disrupted.	Because	breach,	the	moment	where	the	calmness	of	the	ward	collapses,	really	is	the	moment	where	the	logics	of	risk	and	containment	become	undone.		
IV	
Definition	1:		A	‘station’	or	‘position’	is	a	formally	recognized	site	within	an	organization	to	which	powers-to-act,	responsibilities	and	accountability	are	accorded	A	‘relation’	is	a	mode	of	connection	between	two	stations	that	is	characterized	by	a	reciprocal	movement	of	acting	and	being	acted	upon	
Proposition:	Organizations	are	composed	of	stations	and	relations.	Stations	can	be	purely	discursive	objects	(i.e.	‘vision	statement’),	material	arrangements	(i.e.	‘head	office’)	or,	in	the	majority	of	cases,	a	mixture	of	both	(i.e.	‘management’).	Relations	define	stations	through	their	continuous	communication	with	one	another.	Stations	present	themselves	as	the	‘summing	up’	of	the	relations	through	which	they	persist.	
Demonstration:	No	station	can	exist	outside	of	a	network	of	relationships	to	other	stations,	since	such	an	existence	would	have	no	modes	of	connection	and	communication	with	other	stations.	Entering	into	a	network	subjects	a	given	station	to	reciprocal	definition	and	shaping	by	other	stations.	In	this	way,	no	station	can	ever	acquire	
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an	irreversible	status,	since	it	becomes	dependent	on	the	network	of	relations	through	which	it	acts	and	is	acted	upon.		
Corollary:	If	power	is	considered	as	power-to-act,	any	extension	of	the	powers	of	a	given	station	implies	the	growth	of	a	network,	which	exposes	the	station	to	a	greater	range	of	reciprocal	actions	and	increases	its	dependence	on	the	network	as	a	whole.	
Definition	2:		‘Formal	organization’	is	primarily	concerned	with	mapping	the	distribution	of	stations	relative	to	one	another.	‘Informal	organization’	concerns	the	multiplicity	of	relations	that	obtain	between	these	stations	and	how	they	appear	to	the	persons	who	occupy	stations	from	their	respective	positions.		
Proposition:		The	representation	of	an	organization	differs	entirely	depending	on	whether	it	is	stations	or	relations	that	are	being	mapped.	Stations	are	considered	to	have	an	independent	existence,	by	rights,	outside	of	the	relations	in	which	they	are	embedded.	Relations	are,	in	practice,	corrosive	of	the	clear	definition	of	stations.	If	the	formal	or	espoused	logic	of	an	organization	is	presented	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	stations	this	will	inevitably	be	insensitive	to	the	actual	forms	of	connectivity	and	communication	through	which	an	organization	operates	(i.e.	how	things	actually	get	done).	If	the	informal	or	practical	logic	of	an	organization	is	presented	merely	in	terms	of	relations	then	it	will	fail	to	account	for	asymmetries	in	the	distribution	of	rights	and	accountabilities.	Moreover,	any	account	of	an	organization	that	does	not	alternate	between	stations	and	relations	will	be	unable	to	articulate	their	interdependency.		
Demonstration:	Stations	are	defined	by	reference	to	an	external	process	or	agency,	which	accords	them	rights	and	formal	powers	in	principle.	This	lends	them	the	appearance	of	stability	and	completeness,	since	the	act	of	definition	does	not	necessarily	depend	on	any	internal	process.	But	these	external	sources	of	definition	do	not	by	rights	secure	the	practical	means	to	act,	creating	a	gap	between	status	and	effectivity.	Relations	are	defined	through	internal	processes	within	the	network	and	are,	in	practice,	subject	to	continuous,	ongoing	revision.	Because	they	are	not	dependent	on	external	authority,	relations	may	appear	to	be	both	weak	(in	that	they	cannot	necessarily	draw	upon	outside	sources	of	legitimation)	and	strong	(in	that	they	have	a	relative	autonomy	from	outside	forces).	From	this	it	is	clear	that	any	adequate	representation	of	an	organization	will	have	to	be	concerned	with	both	the	external,	de	jure	constitution	of	stations,	and	the	internal,	de	facto	working	out	of	relations.	
Scholium:	
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The	difficulty	of	containing	descriptions	of	both	stations	and	relations	within	a	single	account	pushes	the	analyst	towards	dualism	–	formal	vs	informal;	light	vs	dark;	system	vs	network	and	so	on.	Moreover	this	dualism	is	a	resource	for	organizational	members	themselves,	who	may	readily	alternate	between	accounts	of	‘what	should	happen’	and	‘what	actually	happens’.	This	renders	the	connections	between	stations	and	relations	ever	more	mysterious,	as	though	they	become	one	at	various	points	through	some	kind	of	interactional	alchemy.	The	task	of	the	analyst	then	becomes	that	of	stopping	this	alternation	through	seeking	the	moments	when	it	breaks	down	or	is	acknowledged	as	temporarily	impossible,	through	finding	the	space	that	serves	as	the	catalyst.		
Definition	3:	‘Parasitism’	is	the	interception	of	a	relation	between	two	stations.	It	diverts	what	flows	through	one	relation	into	a	new	direction.	A	parasite	typically	does	not	have	the	status	of	a	‘station’,	although	some	stations	may	deliberately	seek	to	act	in	a	parasitic	mode.		A	‘parasitic	cascade’	occurs	when	one	act	of	interception	is	interrupted	by	a	further	act.	This	creates	a	vulnerability	that	attracts	further	interceptions	without	a	clear	stopping	rule.	‘Value’	is	the	extraction	from	or	redirection	of	a	flow	between	two	stations	into	a	new	direction.		
Proposition:	Parasitism	is	an	inevitable	feature	of	the	relational	arrangement	of	stations.	Because	stations	depend	upon	one	another,	they	must	risk	a	mode	of	connection	or	communication	that	passes	through	a	medium	which	is	not	under	their	complete	control	(i.e.	it	is	outside	the	definition	of	the	station).	Any	given	flow	–	of	information,	materials,	affect	or	discourse	–	is	a	potential	source	of	value	to	an	external	agent	who	is	capable	of	grasping	a	portion	of	that	flow,	or	redirecting	some	of	it.	Ergo:	management	is	constituted	through	its	own	breaking.	In	some	cases,	‘leaders’	may	seek	to	act	in	a	deliberately	disruptive	manner	that	renders	them	as	equivalent	to	parasites,	but	with	considerably	less	potential	for	novelty.	
Demonstration:	Parasites	extract	value	from	the	flows	between	stations	and	appear	to	offer	nothing	in	return.	Parasites	differ	considerably	in	scale	to	the	stations	whose	relations	they	parasitise.	As	such,	they	may	appear	to	be	invisible,	or	at	least	‘unseeable’,	to	stations.	Parasites	exploit	vulnerabilities	in	the	relational	structure	of	networks.	There	can	be	no	network	without	the	possibility	of	parasitism,	since	the	power	of	a	network	depends	upon	its	spread,	which	multiplies	the	points	of	attack.	However,	the	enactment	of	parasitism	creates	a	new	relation,	which	multiplies	the	number	of	stations	involved.	The	parasitic	relation	may,	in	turn,	be	parasitized	by	other	parasites,	which	are	able	to	discern	novel	sources	of	value	in	the	extractive	process.	This	process	can	be	multiplied	exponentially	since,	as	a	process	internal	to	a	network,	there	is	in	principle	no	external	stopping	rule	to	parasitism.	
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Corollary:	We	live	with	our	parasites.	The	only	sure	defence	against	parasitism	is	to	retreat	from	relations,	which	is,	in	effect,	to	break	all	connections	to	others.	In	a	purely	relational	sense,	power	names	the	spread	of	networks,	which	is	simultaneously	the	multiplication	of	the	possibilities	for	parasitism.	However,	given	the	acknowledgement	of	parasitism	within	a	given	field	of	power,	the	position	of	maximum	strength	comes	from	the	anticipation	of	parasitic	cascades	and	the	strategic	positioning	as	the	‘last	in	line’	of	all	the	parasites.	Hence,	organizations	both	anticipate	the	inevitability	of	parasitism	and	develop	the	means	to	parasitise	their	own	parasites	in	such	a	way	that	they	can	manage	and	contain	parasitic	cascades.		
Definition	4:		‘Copula’	are	the	acknowledged	points	of	passage	between	two	or	more	sociomaterial	logics.		The	‘dark	side	of	the	system’	properly	names	a	place	that	it	is	in-between	the	formal	and	informal,	the	espoused	and	the	practical,	the	system	and	the	network.	‘Breach	space’	is	the	emergent	‘third	space’	that	occurs	when	a	parasitic	cascade	interrupts	the	arrangement	of	stations	and	relations.		
Proposition:	Organizations	are	composed	of	stations	and	relations,	which	are	implicated	in	different	modes	of	reason.	Stations	are	distributed	with	reference	to	external	authorities,	whilst	relations	unfold	according	to	an	internal,	emergent	logic.	The	incommensurability	of	the	logics	of	stations	and	relations	is	widely	acknowledged	within	organizations,	as	is	the	need	to	alternate	between	logics	on	occasion.	However,	this	acknowledgement	masks	a	broader	interdependency.	This	implies	the	existence	of	a	‘third	space’	where	both	the	two	logics	combine,	mix	together,	or	become	difficult	to	separate,	in	a	way	that	would	otherwise	be	regarded	as	impossible.	This	occurs	during	moments	of	‘breach’,	where	the	divergence	of	the	two	logics	is	attenuated	and	collapsed.	Such	a	space	occurs	during	moments	of	interruption	to	both	the	formal	and	the	informal	sides	of	organization,	where	both	become	simultaneously	paralysed	and	catalyzed	to	a	novel	mode	of	functioning.	
Demonstration:	Despite	their	interdependency,	it	is	difficult	to	describe	the	distribution	of	stations	and	the	patterning	of	relations	in	a	single	account	of	organizational	life.	Members	can	readily	acknowledge	that	‘but	of	course’	it	is	necessary	at	times	for	there	to	be	an	alternation	between	logics.	Whilst	such	copula	points	are	typically	not	advocated	within	the	logic	itself,	they	are	rarely	treated	as	‘secrets’	or	entirely	sanctionable	matters.	The	‘dark	side’	of	an	organization	is	then	neither	a	hidden	internal	structure,	nor	an	as-yet-unmasked	set	of	external	relations,	but	rather	a	penumbral	space	at	the	limits	of	perception	in	which	the	two	logics	cohere.	Ordinarily,	this	space	is	nowhere	–	it	is	not	part	of	the	mundane	day-to-day	functioning	of	the	organization.	But	its	existence	is	a	necessary	moment	of	
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concrescence	where	the	co-existence	of	incompatible	orders	of	reason	is	accomplished.	It	is	during	periods	of	crisis,	when	the	relations	between	stations	are	parasitized,	that	the	space	temporarily	emerges	and	is	recognized	as	such.	Parasitic	cascades	interrupt	and	disrupt	the	separation	of	the	formal	and	the	informal	and	create	a	superordinate	threat	to	their	mutual	functioning.		
Definition	5:		A	‘parasite’	is	a	form	of	agency	that	is	initially	smaller	in	scale	and	capacity-to-act	than	stations.	Parasites	do	not	typically	exhaust	or	destroy	their	hosts.	Their	destructive	power	is	often	matched	by	their	creative	power.		
Proposition:	Parasites	are	disruptive	of	the	usual	functioning	of	systems.	They	exploit	vulnerabilities	by	finding	ways	of	diverting	small	amounts	of	flows	to	create	value.	Parasites	cannot	produce	order	for	themselves,	but	require	there	to	be	a	prior	form	of	order	onto	which	they	can	latch.	Organizations	very	rarely	collapse	under	the	weight	of	parasites,	except	under	comparatively	rare	circumstances	of	uncontrollable	parasitic	cascades.	Here,	parasites	can	become	sufficiently	engorged	as	to	overcome	their	host,	but	in	doing	so	they	merely	become	a	vector	of	transmission	for	other,	nimbler	parasites.	Although	parasites	appear	to	take	without	giving,	because	they	create	new	forms	of	relationality,	and	force	organizations	to	confront	the	incommensurability	of	stations	and	relations,	they	serve	as	catalysts	for	change.		
Demonstration:		All	organizations	tolerate	a	certain	degree	of	‘leakiness’,	in	strategic,	financial	or	material	terms.	The	flows	that	compose	an	organization	are	always	vulnerable	to	extraction	by	a	third	party.	If	this	exploitation	remains	at	a	sufficiently	small	scale,	the	organization	is	unlikely	to	see	the	outright	rejection	of	the	parasite	as	a	pressing	priority.	However,	the	possibility	of	the	escalation	of	parasitism	is	a	significant	concern,	and	for	this	reason	apparently	minor	events	may	become	unduly	important	to	the	organization	because	of	the	anxiety	around	scaling	up.	This	anticipation	may	have	value	to	the	organization,	because	it	acts	as	driver	for	reviewing	its	own	practices	and	relationships	that	lie	outside	its	own	networks.	In	the	rare	cases	where	the	parasite	actually	takes	the	place	of	the	organization,	it	rapidly	becomes	the	target	for	immediate	further	parasitism.	
Scholium:	Is	a	parasite	a	station	or	a	relation?	Probably	neither,	although	some	stations	act	in	‘parasitic’	manner,	and	some	instances	of	parasitism	become	sufficient	intense	as	to	give	rise	to	what	appears	to	be	a	new	station.	Is	parasitism	a	‘good’	or	‘bad’	thing?	The	question	is	meaningless	in	itself.	Parasitism	inevitably	happens	and	constitutes	a	threat	and	a	cost	to	existing	stations	and	relations,	but	draws	out	novel	responses	that	can	transform	stations	and	multiply	relations.	Is	the	analyst	a	‘parasite’?	On	most	occasions,	probably	not,	since	the	analyst	rarely	‘breaks’	or	‘paralyses’	any	part	of	the	organization,	but	instead	typically	latches	onto	an	existing	vectors	of	parasitism	and	thereby	‘parasitises	the	parasites’.		
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Definition	6:	‘Anticipation’	is	the	imagining	of	possible	futures	based	on	the	prolongation	of	the	current	logics	in	play	and	the	potential	challenges	they	may	encounter.	‘Anticipation	of	breach’	is	an	unspeakable	acknowledgement	of	the	collapse	of	different	orders	of	reason	into	one	another	in	emergent,	yet	predictable,	events.	
Proposition:	Organizations	are	principally	driven	by	the	anticipation	of	breach.	Although	these	moments	are	comparatively	rare,	they	cast	a	long	shadow	over	the	organization.	In	breach,	the	organization	is	forced	to	confront	the	incommensurability	between	the	logics	in	play,	and	the	necessity	of	their	separation.	Breach	is	a	moment	of	collapse	and	recognition.	Since	the	ongoing	functioning	of	the	organization	relies	precisely	on	the	‘unseeing’	of	divergences	in	logic,	despite	tolerance	of	their	mutual	co-existence,	breach	presents	itself	as	the	unraveling	of	the	coherence	of	the	incompatible.	But	in	the	same	way	that	the	recognition	of	the	inevitability	of	parasitism	has	a	productive	value,	so	the	unspoken	acknowledgement	of	breach	does	the	work	of	enabling	the	organization	to	maintain	an	active	engagement	with	its	own	contradictions.	
Demonstration:	A	given	order	of	reason	within	an	organization	is	defined	against	a	second	order,	whose	projects	and	values	can	only	be	tolerated	if	they	are	amenable	to	translation.	In	this	way,	orders	of	reason	may	cohere	in	an	organization	because	it	appears	that	everyone	is	signed	up	to	the	same	objectives,	despite	the	fact	that	these	goals	have	been	significantly	re-imagined	and	re-purposed	across	the	competing	logics.	Rather	than	being	actively	repressed,	the	incommensurability	between	logics	remains	acknowledged.	The	possibility	of	breach	represents	a	moment	where	the	separation	of	orders	may	collapse,	revealing	their	mutual	foundation	in	a	project	which	is	incomprehensible	if	it	were	to	be	subject	to	a	single	definition.	Thus,	avoidance	of	breach	is	an	act	that	both	restates	the	importance	of	the	separation	of	logics	and	tacitly	affirms	their	dependence.	The	avoidance	of	breach	is	therefore	a	major	driving	force	within	the	organization.	This	might	be	considered	as	a	third,	unrepresentable	and	unspeakable	order	of	reason	that	underpins	those	that	are	overtly	in	play.	
Afterword	Dark	organizational	theory	is	a	descriptive	practice	rooted	in	an	ethnographic	sensibility	that	focuses	on	the	divergence	between	different	orders	of	reason	in	organizational	and	institutional	settings.	It	treats	incommensurability	not	as	an	obstacle,	but	rather	as	an	inevitable,	functional	aspect	of	organizational	life.	As	Deleuze	&	Guattari	(1983)	once	quipped	‘things	work	because	they	don’t	work’.	Coherence	between	diverse	local	orders	of	reason	is	a	routine	accomplishment.	It	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	to	members	that	there	are	different	agendas	and	modes	of	ordering	in	play	that	are	not,	in	principle,	easily	resolved,	and	may	in	fact	be	seemingly	at	odds	with	the	espoused	purpose	of	the	organization.	Whilst	there	is	intrinsic	value,	we	would	argue,	in	giving	voice	to	‘stories	from	the	
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frontline’	of	modern	organizational	life,	doing	so	does	not	amount	to	a	critical	work	of	revealing	what	was	supposedly	‘hidden’.	The	contribution	of	dark	organizational	theory	is	instead	to	demonstrate	that	whilst	competing	sociomaterial	logics	can	be	generally	acknowledged	within	an	organization,	their	mutual	co-existence	requires	a	systematic	work	of	‘unseeing’	and	‘unsensing’	in	everyday	practice.	This	requires	considerable	‘affective	labour’	on	the	part	of	members	who	not	only	have	to	the	face	the	challenge	of	enacting	their	own	practice,	but	also	ensuring	that	they	‘disattend’	as	far	as	possible	to	the	rival	logics	that	are	in	play	(even	when	these	alternative	logics	are	potentially	compelling).	The	focus	is	then	on	the	local,	contingent	work	of	producing	coherence	in	organizational	and	institutional	settings	that	teeter	on	the	verge	of	continuous	incoherence.	Despite	their	incommensurability,	sociomaterial	logics	have	forms	of	interdependency.	Some	are	clearly	marked	as	agreed	points	of	passage	or	‘copula’,	but	other	broader	forms	of	interdependence	only	fully	emerge	at	moments	of	‘breach’,	where	a	reversibility	and	collapse	between	logics	occurs.	Breach	is	an	interruption	or	‘parasitism’	of	established	relations	that	cuts	across	the	differences	of	logics.	It	creates	a	temporary	and	unstable	‘third	space’	of	mixture	where	a	new	form	of	order	is	extracted,	to	the	cost	of	the	organization.	Breach	presents	as	a	threat	to	the	whole	range	of	local	modes	of	ordering	and	compels	a	response	that	inverts	their	existing	logics	(although	it	often	concludes	with	the	transformation	and	reaffirmation	of	incommensurability).	The	central	proposition	of	dark	organization	theory	is	that	anticipation	of	breach,	rather	than	the	specific	goals	of	‘formal’	or	‘informal’	organizing,	is	of	central	significance	for	understanding	why	organizations	do	what	they	do.		Critique	then	needs	to	begin	by	becoming	attuned	to	when	and	how	breach	is	possible,	learning	from	the	affective	practices	of	members	who	are	skilled	in	its	anticipation.	The	moments	where	management	–	in	its	broadest	sense	–	faces	its	own	breakdown	become	pivotal	to	understanding	how	the	organization	goes	on.	The	analyst	has	to	learn	to	think	like	the	parasite,	pursue	a	kind	of	‘parasite	logic’	(see	Brown,	2013)	in	their	investigations.	Dark	organizational	theory	is	not	a	theory	as	such,	although	it	can	be	presented	as	a	set	of	conceptual	propositions3.	It	does	not	lend	itself	to	easy	empirical	application,	although	it	enhances	sensitivity	to	‘third	spaces’.	It	does	not	bring	us	any	closer	to	what	management	is	‘actually’	doing.	But	it	suggests,	with	some	plausibility,	we	want	to	claim,	tell	us	what	it	is	that	managers	and	the	managed	glimpse	for	a	moment	when	they	forget	what	it	is	that	are	supposed	to	be	looking	at.			
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Acknowledgement	We	would	like	to	thank	the	three	anonymous	referees	and	the	section	editors	for	their	extraordinarily	helpful	comments	and	suggestions,	many	of	which	they	will	see	directly	reflected	in	the	text.																																																												1	The	term	‘competing	logics’	refers	here	to	the	relationship	between	diverse	modes	of	constituting	sociomaterial	‘objects’	(e.g.	‘good	care’,	‘reduction	of	risk’,	‘recovery’)	and	‘subjects’	(‘patient	with	self-insight’,	‘empathic	carer’)	within	a	specific	practice,	along	with	the	‘rationales’	that	emerge	within	the	mode	(see	Mol,	2008).	This	differs	from	the	notion	of	an	‘institutional	logic’	as	a	higher-level	belief	system	rendered	operant	within	a	practice	by	way	of	a	focus	on	both	the	emergent	nature	of	the	mode	of	ordering,	and	the	manner	in	which	meaning	emerges	through	the	local	and	provisional	concrescence	of	subject	and	objects	(e.g.	shifts	in	the	funding	of	care	result	in	ongoing	transformations	of	what	counts	as	recovery	and	effective	doctoring/nursing).			2	The	idea	of	‘the	third’	or	‘thirdness’	has	a	long	history	in	the	humanities	and	social	sciences,	including	the	postcolonial	theory	of	Homi	Bhabha	(2004)	and	Edward	Soja’s	(1996)	‘thirdspace’.	The	common	thread	there	is	that	of	mixture	and	the	confrontation	with	alterity.	In	the	context	of	‘dark	organization	theory’,	thirdness	refers	to	the	anticipation	and	temporary	emergence	of	a	space	where	the	incommensurability	of	logics	becomes	starkly	apparent	and	can	no	longer	be	adequately	managed.	It	is	informed	directly	by	Michel	Serres’	concern	with	the	impossible	origins	of	multiplicity	–	i.e.	‘trampled	multiplicity’,	‘clinamen’,	‘parasitic	cascades’	(see	Brown,	2002).	3	The	extent	to	which	these	propositions	draw	heavily	on	Serres	(1982)	should	be	readily	apparent.	
